Introduction
Oriental Christianity is not only a special part of global Christianity, but also its oldest one. The members of the ancient Christian community in the Helleni stic city of Antioch were the first to be called christianoiChristians.' But with the recent developments of the Syrian Crisis, the deeprooted Chri stians of the region see themselves as a threatened minority. Since the Islami st rebel militia, the so called al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah ("The Islamic State") announced the establi shment of a caliphate in parts of the region of northeastern Syria and northwestern Iraq, threats against local Christians have been occurring more frequently. Recently, Islami sts have forced Christians to either convert to Islam, to flee , or in the case of refusal, they have even been killed (00120 14).
Despite their traditional roots, the Syrian Christians had hardly attracted attention in Western media. This fact has changed recently with the outbreak of the Syrian Crisis. Before the ri se of the Islamists during the Syrian War, statements of the Syrian Patriarchs pledging loyalty to the Syrian State, triggered reactions in the Western media which varied between surprise and incomprehension . Although much of such pro-government statements 22 CHRI STOf'H L EO NHARDT appeared in the media, academic studies investigating the attitudes of Christians in the Syrian Conflict are rare. While C hri stians only account for 8-10% of the entire Syrian population, the neighbouring country of Lebanon has a share of around 35%, which, on a percentage level , is the highest number of Chri stian minorities in the entire Arab world. Both Lebanon as we ll as Syria belonged to the League of Nations Mandate for Syria and Lebanon between 1923 and 1943 , and the countries are historically, politically and soc iall y deeply connected till today.
The current situation of the Orthodox Christians in Lebanon
The G reek Orthodox Church is also known as the Rum Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch and All the East, whereas the term "Rum" derives from the Arabic word for Byzantium, which used to refer to the (Eastem-) Roman Empire (Wessels 1995: 67) . Since 2012 , its head is John X. Yazigi (* 1955) . Its patriarchy has all in all about four million church members (Hage 2007: 79) . Due to va rious waves of emigration throughout the 19,h and the 20'" century, today their smaller part is located in the Middle East, where their most numerous diaspora with up to 2.7 million believers is based in Central and South America (Ibid.).
In Lebanon , there are up to 200,000 officially registered Greek Orthodox believers (Hage 2007: 79) . Their denominational majority is manifested in the rural area Kura, in the north of the country. However, the Greek Orthodox Church is the most decimated denomination by emigration and lacks solid communal cohesion (Panzer 1998: 22) . It only holds secondary positions in Lebanon 's politica l setup. Historically, the Greek Orthodox congregation was already reduced to a minority in "G reater Lebanon". Nevertheless it had constituted the second largest Chri stian denomination, and their interests lead to connect to the sti ll sec ular groups of Arab sociali sm. They maintained closer relations to the Sunnis than most of the other Chri stian congregations and through their engagement for Arabism they even provided an important contribution to the "Arab Renaissance" (nahdah) and to Arab nationali sm. As the Arabic folklore gives the Patriarchate the character of the "Arab Orthodox" C hurch , the Greek Orthodox Chri stians see themselves often as Arabs through acc ulturation (Zein AI-Din 2010: 118).
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At the beginning of the long-lasting Lebanese Civil War, their synod recommended to their believers to refrain from any violence (Panzer 1998 : 22) . However, many of the Greek Orthodox joined the ranks of various militias. After the Israeli invasion (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) , Orthodox institutions were no longer spared from the war, and many of the Greek Orthodox Christians considered themselves victims of a civil war, a conflict in which many of them originally wanted to remain uninvolved, as they had not formed an own confess ional militia (Tamcke 2008: 168) .
The Syriac Orthodox Church of Antioch and All the East emerged from the Hell en istic centre of its title. It is rooted in the Aramaic-speaking Christian community of Syria and Mesopotamia, and presents a vehicle of one of the oldest cultures in the world. Since 20 14, the patriarchy is headed by Moran Mor Ignatius Ephrem II. Karim (* 1965) . The Syriac Orthodox Church community amounts to around one million faithful , whose smallest part lives in the Middle East, in Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Lebanon. It has approximately 30,000 believers in Lebanon, and constitutes the fourth largest denomination (Merten J 997: 212). The patriarchy is also known as the " West Syrian" or "Jacobite" (after J. Baradaeus (t 578), former Bishop of Edessa) Church (Hage 2007: 130) . After the genocide of the Armenians in 191 5, which had also claimed many victims among the Syriac Orthodox Christians, most denominational members emigrated to the Lebanese capital Beirut 3 In this city, they mainly lived economically hedged; they also remained in the country during the Civil War. Despite the fact that their patriarch proclaimed neutrality, many Syriac Orthodox Christians fought ,mder the Assyrian Movement whose aim was a Chri stian influenced Lebanon (Merten J 997: 212). As they were engaged in Chri stian parties, they initially received support from Syrian armed forces, which intervened in the Lebanese Civil War in J 976. Nevertheless, the Syriac Orthodox Christians still felt politically underrepresented. Even though a Syriac Orthodox managed to become a Member of Parliament for the first time in 1993 and even stood up for the interests of the disenfranchised majority of Syrians, the problem of stateless refugees among the Syriac Orthodox congregation in Lebanon is still present to this day (Merten 1997: 211-212) .
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The current situation of the Orthodox Christians in Syria
In the multi -ethnic and multi-religious mosaic of Syria exist a variety of Christian denominations ' Under the ruling Baath party, freedom of religion was guaranteed through the Syrian Constitution of 1973 as we ll as through the constitutional referendum of20 12; Christians used to practice their faith quite openly. Therefore, Syria has not only a strong appeal among Arab Christians, but also had a long reputation of being the safest country for Christians in the entire Middle East (Awad 2012: 84) .
As half of the two million Syrian Christians are connected to the Greek Olthodox Patriarchate of Antioch and all the East, it constitutes the largest church of Syria. Its important communities are in Damascus, in the northwestern city of Latakia and in the adjacent coastal region. An almost exclusive ly Greek Orthodox area represents the "Valley of the Christians" (Wadi at Nasara) near Homs. Basically, the Greek Orthodox Christians enjoyed favourable li ving conditions and their influence on the economy is present until today; some personalities held important state positions and were policy advisers. While politicall y underrepresented in regards to their numerica l size, the Greek Orthodox Christians were often accused of being close to the country's power system; but by and large, they have chosen to keep Iowa profile in terms of politics (Awad 2012: 82) . For the Syriac Orthodox Church , which has only about 200,000 adherents in Syria, the country is still regarded as their hi storical centre. Up to 70% of their communities are descended from immigrants who mainly came to Syria in the aftermath ofthe "seyfo". Most of the Syriac Orthodox Chri stians li ve in northeastern part of Syria, in the cities of Damascus, Aleppo, Horns, and in the province of Hassaka, where their ecclesiastical centre is based in the Syrian-Turkish border town ofQamishli. The Syriac Orthodox denomination benefited from the friendly attitude of the Syrian secu lar state towards minorities; the Syrian government even allowed them to teach in their traditional Syriac language' . On the other hand, the church was partly served as a basis for recruiting Christian candidates for the 
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Baath party (Beck & Collet 20 I 0: 90) . Whatever the case, their church had refrained from politics (Merten 1997: 209) .
The development of the Syrian Crisis
Bashar ai-Assad (* 1965) came into power after the death of his father Hafez in 2000; he inherited a stable, but split system. Unlike the uprisings of other Arab countries, the protest movement in Syria erupted relatively slowly. The state apparatus discredited the protest movement as a foreign conspiracy, but government forces were confronted with escalating riots and became embroiled in violent repression. The militarization of the conflict led to an open power struggle between armed rebel groups of the so called Free Syrian Army (FSA ) -which were increasingly joined by criminal gangs and religiously motivated groups -and government forces. (McElroy & Samaan: 2012) . The increasing escalation fostered the di sintegration of the Syrian institutions, its territory and its society (Rosiny 2013: 8) . From 2013 on, the conflict became more violent and meanwhile the opposition more dependent on foreign funding which finally led to its radicalization, because financial flows of the main donors from Saudi Arabia and Qatar mainly reached radicalized opposition groups. This favoured the establishment of local, radical Salafist groups, such as Harakal Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiyah (" Islamic movement of the free men of the Levant"), as well as Islamist groups, as Jabhal al-Nlisrah ("Nusra Fron!") or the so called al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah. The rebel groups received funding not only from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and Turkey, but also from the US , France and the UK, which was one aspect leading Islamist hardliners to declare jihad. The boost of these jihadist movements was accompanied by a seemingly ever-increasing confessionalisation of the conflict, while on the other side Iran and Russia strengthened its military, financial and economic assistance towards the Syrian government.
The increase of sectarian attacks as well as sectarian rhetoric simultaneously promoted the further influx of external sponsors. Since the majority of the opposition is Sunni and the state apparatus is disproportionately represented by the Alawite minority, these circumstances -at least at first sight -had paved way for a sectarian interpretation (Helberg 2012: 39 
2013: 2).
A crucial aspect for their scepticism is not only the lack of endeavour towards a democratic transition among the oppositions groups, but also their lack of understanding of democratic principles. Although the secular forces indeed fight for political participation, a great part of the opposition rejects democratic dispositions. In contrast, the surveyed Orthodox Christians have the impression that the actual goal of the opposition is the overthrow of the secular system: "The only reason of this conflict is to topple the secular regime and implement an islamic state, and we can see this already now by what is going on in the areas without the control of the regime" (Saliba 2013 : 2).
In thi s context, the opposition's understanding of democracy wou ld be comparable with a rule of the majority. As the power distribution runs alongside confessional boundary lines, in this concept democracy would be equated with an exclusive Sunni rule. According to the interviewees, these convictions can be illustrated by the fact that none of the political parties belonging to the opposition has integrated the concept of equality of all citizens to their agenda. In contrast, large parts are supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, whereby the opposition 's model offers no interesting alternative for the Christian minorities. Although more political participation in Syria would be desirable, Arab Christians have -at least according to their own
CH RISTOPH L EONIIARDT
statements -never known a regime that respected the values of human rights or treated Christians as equal citizens. Due to thi s reason, the Orthodox Christians wish to preserve their religious freedom rather than achi evi ng their political freedom:
"There is no guarantee at all for the Christians. We don ' t care about free elections, about political freedom so much as about our religious freedom" (S. C. 2013: 3).
Their doubts are also fuelled by the di vergence between the stated objectives of the opposition and reality in the so called " liberated areas" . The slated goals of the political opposition are being destroyed as they hardly have any control of the activities of rebel groups on the ground. Although the political opposition is debating about democracy, freedom and human ri ghts, rebels groups lerrorise the population. While Christians in governmentcontrolled areas feel relati vely safe, they mainly live in fear in rebel-held regions. For this reason, the opposition -by now being dominated by Islami st groups -does not embody liberation, but rather a real threat to the Orthodox Christians. These impressions can be confirmed by anti-Christian attacks in the " liberated areas". In thi s regard, al most all the interviewed Orthodox Chri stians spoke about killings and kidnappings, as well as targeted attacks on Chri stians, their churches and possessions. These assaults bear the clear intention to either force the Christian s to conversion or to di splace or exterminate the Syrian Chri stians. As such, the new Islamist movement is a major threat for the entire existence of the Orthodox Christianity in Syria, which is why the jihadists are labelled as "enemies of the Christian s": "Besides, the Syrian army is not an enemy to the Christians ( .. ) But the Islamist rebels are an enemy to the Christians, because it is a threat to the existence of Christians in Syria" (Ibid.: 2) .
Ever since the Islamists have become one of the most powerful combat units within the rebel groups, they have caused great anxiety among Oriental Christianity.
Also, the negative attitude of the Orthodox Christians towards the opposition is based on the experience of their coreligionists in Iraq and
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Egypt. In the context of the sectarian attacks in Syria, parallel s are drawn to the situations of Christians in other Arab countries that have been hit by political unrest. The US-led invasion of Iraq 2003 , brought a strong growth of Islami st movements, w hich caused many Iraqi Christians to fl ee to Syria. There, the Iraqi refugees then fled to predominately Christian areas. Through the interviews it becomes clear that the negative experiences of their Iraqi coreligion ists were already " in the heads" of the Syrian Christians even before the conflict had begun:
"The image of the Christians in Iraq was in our heads and the Christians were very afraid of that" (I shac 2013 : I ).
As comparable waves of refugees have also started in Syria, the local Christians are in fear of a "second Iraq" for their Christian heritage in Syria:
"The Christian heritage in Iraq is in danger and will probably vanish (. . .) we are afraid that Syria is going to turn into a 'second Iraq '. I think, all the Christians in Syria are in fear of this scenario and it is
likely going to happen, if ai-Assad will fair (S . c. 20 13: 7).
T heir anxiety is also caused by the situation of their Egyptian coreli g ioni sts after the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak (* 1928) . Although Orthodox Copts demonstrated with Muslims against the military dictatorship, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood during the uprising in Egypt in 2011 created anxiety (Herman: 2013). In the turmoi l of the revolution 's aftermaths, members of the Muslim Brotherhood attacked not only churches, but also even C hristians. This betrayal of confidence as well as the group's dominance in the Syrian opposition raised the fear level of the Orthodox Christians: that they would be cheated by the Muslim Brotherhood and that the Orthodox Christians experience "another Egypt" :
"We were afraid that Syria turns into 'another Egypt' dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, because they also dominate great parts of the Syrian opposition" (L. R. 201 3: 3).
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Lastly, the surveyed Orthodox Christians are conv icted that the living conditions for all Syrian Chri stians would look gloomi er after a poss ible ovel1hrow of the secular system. Due to the incidents in the " liberated areas", there is a common view within the C hristian congregations that the ultimate goa l is in fact the foundin g of an Islamic state on all of Syria. This assumption is confirmed by implementation ofthe shari'a law, an indicator that rebels seek to introduce their fu ndamenta li st system everywhere in Syria and probabl y even far beyond: The appli cation of the Islamic law also underpins their fear that they will have to li ve under a dhimmi status and that they will be second-class citizens, e.g. just as it happened under Ottoman rule.' The Orthodox representati ves are convinced that not only the Chri stians, but also even the moderate, nonfundamentalist Sunnis are in fear of an Islamist's rise to power: "There is no room for olher minorities and they [Ihe Islam isis] reinterpreted Islam in the way it favours them (. . .) The f ear now is really in the heart of all the Syrian Christians and even in the heart of all the Druzes and the Alawites and moderate Sunnis, too" (Davie 2013: 2) .
It has to be emphasized that there is a real threat that massacres against the Christian minorities could take place in the case of a complete political vac uum after a possible overthrow of the secular system.
The attitude of the Orthodox Christians towards the Syrian government
According to the interviewed Greek and the Syriac Orthodox Christians, the majority of the Christians still support the Syrian government. The guarantee of religious freedom reveals that it is one of the main pillar regarding their supporti ve stance. The secular system guarantees the free exerci se of religion. Christians are neither discriminated by the secular state, The constitutional right to build churches, to acquire additional land, and to receive financial support by the Syrian state, is viewed as positive by the Orthodox Christians. Moreover, the secu lar state guarantees Christian holidays and their Holy Masses are broadcast on television and radio. Furthennore, all Syrian citizens have the opportunity to appear freely in public, without being veiled, which gives the Syrian Christians an additional sense of freedom in the usually very traditionally oriented Arab world. Finally, the Christians are able to freely express and develop their cultural and religious identities in a quite liberal society: Although some of the Orthodox Christians criticize the government, the vast majority of the respondents assessed the developments since Hafez al-Assad's rise to power, as positive. While corruption, the lack of political participation and the abuse of human right are seen negatively, the stability and safety under the ai-Assad rule are praised . Through a Gallup poll , conducted before the crisis erupted, concerning the inhabitant's personal assessments of the security situation in the country, Syria indeed used to be viewed as one of the safest countries in the world (Real Clear World 2009 ).
Additionally, Christians enjoyed free education, a stable economy and a relatively high standard of living. On the other hand, there is an impression among the Orthodox representatives that the Syrian army is protecting the Christians from the rebels during the on going fighting. According to the interviews, the secu lar alignment of the state even creates a common ground for all religious communities. In contrast to the exclusive concept of political Islam, its separation of state and religion makes it possible to gather all Syrian citizens under one banner of cultural freedom: In the context of the protecti ve function of the Baath party, not only the religious affi liation, but also the reputation of the President plays a decisive factor. Even though the Orthodox Christians are aware of the negative aspects of the ruling party, its majority nevertheless tends to emphasize Bashar alAssad's reputation. Even after the outbreak of the uprising, the President reached out to the opposition, by implementing reforms, banning the state of emergency law, allowing political parties, and reali zing a broad sa lary increase. According to the surveyed Orthodox Chri stian s, these efforts would in fact have revealed al-Assad 's willingness for political reforms: Since the Alawite President -like the Syrian Christians -belongs to a religious minority, it is a widespread Orthodox position to feel rather connected to him than to any other leader of the predominately Sunni opposition. Due to the fact that the political alternative of the opposition will probably be an Islamic one, Bashar aI-Assad and the Baath party represent the best possible option for the Christians in Syria. As even more popularity has been attributed to the current President than to his father Hafez ai-Assad:
"What serves the regime is that Bashar ai-Assad is much more popular than his fathel; because he is very close to the Syrians, who like him" (D. B. 2013: I).
The loya l attitude of the Christians towards the Syrian government is embedded in a wider regional context. Unlike Syria, many of the Christian minorities in the Arab world have been discriminated due to their rei igious affiliation . Whi le Christians rarely seek protection from Arab states, the Syrian Christians are not subjected to repressive measures by their government.
Whereas the entire Chri stianity of Iraq is threatened by total disappearance -with nowadays many of the Iraqi Christians wishing the return of the ousted Saddam Hussein: -the friendly policy of the Baath party towards religious minorities provides an important protection for the Syrian Christians. Therefore, most of the Orthodox Christians come to the conclusion that, in comparison to almost all other Arab countries, Syria's secu lar system is one of the safest for the preservation of the existence of Oriental Christianity in the Middle East:
" We as Christians felt very save in Syria. You could not compare Syria to the rest of the Middle East (. .. ) in the entire region, Syria was the best country for the Christians" (Saliba 2013: 5).
While the Greek Orthodox Christians mainly emphasize regional aspects, the Syriac Orthodox's focus is on the historical context, with a clear reference on the "seyji/'. The genocide in Armenia that led to the disappearance of their confessional group has been solidified in their collective memory. As Christians could enjoy a secure life in Syria until the beginning of the crisis, the surveyed Christians explained this fact to the friendly attitude of the ruling Baath party towards the Christians, which enabled them to preserve their "sacred heritage":
"For the Syriac Orthodox it was so important to live a life in security, we felt safe jor over 40 years (. . .) There is a historical heritage to keep (. .. ) this Holy history is in danger to get destroyed and even the historic monasteries and churches are in danger to vanish (. . .) [the Syrian government} gave us the protection and the possibility to keep Ollr religious heritage" (A. M. 2013: 2).
As the early 20" century genocide occurred at a period of political uprisings, the Syriac Orthodox community is in fear of a fundamental political change in Syria. They prefer to li ve in peace under a stable system, albeit the authoritarian order of the Syrian government:
" Even Christians who are neutral think in this way, because they believe that a further existence of the Syrian regime is good (..) First of all, they are afraid of the chaos that could break out [after its fall}" (Kattan 2013: 7).
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The attitude of the Orthodox Christians towards the Syrian Conflict
Concerning the outbreak of the Syrian Crisis, the Greek and Syriac Orthodox C hri stians initially had a positive attitude. As shown in the interviews, they did not only understand the need fo r refonns, but had sympathy for the protester 's demand for political partici pation as the basic right of the People:
"All the people of the world have a right to change their country that they are belonging to (. . .) At the beginning of the revolution in Syria the opposition had good aims for a change" (A. M. 20 13: I).
Some of the Christians had even taken part in the emerging protests. Regardless of this fact , a reluctance to actively support the movement dominated among the Christians, and their majority kept di stant from the demonstrations. The reasons for thi s pass ivity were on the one hand the sati sfaction and the loyalty to the ruling Baath party and on the other hand it was a lack of poli tica l a lternatives and the uncertainty of the moveme nt's possible outcome. Not on ly their minori ty status, but also their lack of opportunities as a coherent political entity pl ayed a significant role for the reluctance of the Orthodox Chri stians to j oin the protest movement. Generally, the initial sympathy regarding the outbreak of the upri sing seems to apply much more to the Greek than to the Syriac Orthodox Chri stians.
While their sympathy for the upri sing only refe rs to the vety onset of the demonstrations, the majority o f Chri stians soon tended to take a more di stant attitude. Many of the surveyed Orthodox C hristians are convinced that the protest movement was Islam ic from the very beginning. In the interviews, this assumption is justified by the theory that imams initiated the demonstrations during the Friday prayers. Thi s impress ion was triggered by the fac t that most of the demonstrations came from the mosques and Islamic fl ags and slogans, such as "Allahu Akbar", quickly emerged :
" The uprising was religious from the very beginning on. It started jimn the mosques, ji'DIn the Sunnis. You couldn i see the Islamic elements at .first, but if you looked afler only two or three weeks (. . .) they started to carryj/ags of Islam and shouting like 'Allahu Akbar and aI/ these islamic slogans. At this time, i thought that this is the real intention of it, they want a SUl1l1i-Shari 'a islamic State in Syria" (S, c. 2013: 6), T HE CREF;K-AND THE $ YRJAC-O Il.THODOX PATK I A RCH AT ES O~· A NTIOCH
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Based on their assessments, the Orthodox Christians classified the protests as religiously motivated, which at the same time evoked increasing fear among them. Other reasons for the distancing of the Christians from the protests were severa l incidents of violent riots. Some of the interviewees experienced such clashes in Syria as direct eyewitnesses: Their personal experiences gave them the impression that the violence was started by the demonstrators and therefore the uprising was not only Islamic, but also violent. These changes in personal opinions seems to have also affected the general attitude of the Christians. Argumentatively, the Christian principle of non-violence plays a key role and this pacifist position has lead to the circumstance that few Christians formed militias or defended themselves by the force of anns: Irrespective of the actual date of the initial outbreak of violence and rise of radical Islamism in the ranks of the opposition, these two factors turn out to be the main reasons why the initial sympathy of the Christians has shifted to a predominantly negative attitude towards the Syrian Crisis.
There is also a widespread rejection among the Orthodox Christians of the process of internationali zation and confessionalisation of the Syrian Conflict. Although they are aware of the socio-economic divisions among the population, the sentiment among the Christians is that the protests were initiated by foreign forces. In this theory, parts of the poorer population were bribed to organi ze a protest movement or at least to actively sponsor its expansion. According to the Orthodox Christians, the crisis has therefore little to do with a popular movement: (A. M. 2013: 4) .
According to the interviews, this secta rian level can be seen by attacks on Shiite shrines as well by religiously motivated repri sal attacks against predominantly Sunn; areas. While sectarianism has not played a signifi cant role in the Syrian society, this hateful thinking against other confessional groups has now become a major question in the conflict. This political manoeuvring, which was originally initiated by external powers, aimed to di sempower the Alawite President Bashar ai-Assad and to weaken Syria's ally, Iran. Therefore, the Syrian Conflict has become a proxy war with a sectarian dimension: " Today, the war in Syria is a kind of proxy war between Saudi Arabia, which is Sunni, and fran, which is Shiite, and their conflict is taking place on Syrian territory" (Ibid.). Lastly, there is a large disenchantment concerning the lack of support for the Syrian Christians by the West, which the Orthodox representatives sti ll consider to be "Christian". But since their appeals for help have been rejected by Western diplomats, the Christians have gained the impression that their ancient heritage in the Middle East has no meaning at all for Western powers:
"[As long] we have bad European leaders who do not care about the
Christianity as much our future will be dark (. .. ) They do not care about the Christianity in the Middle East rather they are all slaves of fsrael" (Saliba 2013: 7-8) .
Critical analysis of the Orthodox Christian attitude towards the Syrian opposition
In the context of the critical analysis of the interviews with the Middle East experts, the reality of the Syrian society has to be taken into consideration.
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The outbreak of the Syrian Crisis was primarily lead by young activists, who were composed of the "Local Coordination Committees" (LCC) and the "Syrian Revolution General Commission (SRGC)", uniting different affiliations. A second movement established under the umbrella of the NCC (The National Coordination Committee for the Forces of Democratic Change), was created from severa l parties and organizations. It received limited financial support and was often considered as pseudo-opposition group in Syria, and therefore was soon rejected. A third movement emerged out of several opposition meetings and conferences and was formed abroad as the SNC. However, since many representatives officially expressed their personal opinion, contradictory positions and statements appeared:
"But now the problem in Syria is that the Sunni community is very fragmented. Not even the exile government [the SNCJ is indeed united or speaks with one voice" (Hanf 20 13: 4).
Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey firmly supported the Muslim Brotherhood in the SNC (Syrian National Council), which boosted thi s fraction to the most powerful force . The Council was replaced by the "National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition forces" (NCR) in November 2012. Although it was established under the leadership of the Chri stian G. Sabrah, this fact neither led to trust by the majority of the Syrian people nor by the Christians.
" George Sabrah ( .. .J knows nothing, no one respects him actually in Syria and the problem is that the Germans, the Europeans and the Americans know that these people of Istanbul and Doha have no chance of winning anything in Syria in a free vote. This is why they want alAssad out" (Awad 2013: 4).
Disputes over alliance partnerships and funding sources led to its fragmentation and increasing conflicts of interest finally prevented a unified military and political strategy.
Furthermore the opposition has shown increasing shortcomings in terms of democratic endeavours. The lack of understanding of democracy was also di sclosed through the opposition's dealing regarding the Kurdish
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issue. Overall, the inability of the opposition to unite its branches under a define policy agenda, is reflected in the legitimacy deficit among the Syrians as well as the Syrian Christians (Helberg 2012: 98).
On the other hand, the lack of understanding of democracy reveals habits gained under the authoritarian rule, under which the Syrian population has been living for decades. Although there are several hints in the interviews that even the Christians would welcome more political participation , their criticisms of the opposition also show their fear of a political majority concept, simply due to the fact that they would need to refrain from some comfortable benefits:
"/think that these statements [against the opposition} clearly reflect the fear of many Christians, as they as a minority are afraid of a majority concept" (Hanf2013: 4).
After all, the church hierarchy can hardly be described as democratic, as it has itself adopted certain authoritarian structures: While Christians are not the only victims of sectarian violence, the fact that they are the only non-Muslim religious community in Syria makes their situation even more precarious. Since the Christians -like the Alawitesare being denounced as infidels, anti-Christian attacks are on rise. lncidents, such as the kidnapping of the two bishops (Naharnet 2013) , the murder of the former Syrian Minister of Defence D. Rajiha (1947 Rajiha ( -2012 , who was also an Orthodox Christian (EI-Bashara 2012), or the sectarian attacks against predominantly Christian areas in opposition-controlled territories (Open Doors 2013), has increased the fear among the Orthodox Christians.
Despite these negative developments, certain factors have to be considered, according to the surveyed Middle East experts. For example, Iraqi Christians had close relations to Saddam Hussein (1937 Hussein ( -2006 and as 42 C HRJSTOPH L EON H ..... RDT a result they were regarded as fonner collaborators after his fall. Moreover, the fleeing Iraqi Christians primarily searched refuge in Christiandominated areas in Syria, which had a decisive impact on the local Syrian Christians ' perceptions. In a YouCov poll conducted in December 20 II , 55% of surveyed Syrians supported of the Syrian government, of which 46% explained that their loyalty was based on the fear of a "second Iraq" (Doha Debates 2012: 8) .
Critical analysis of the Orthodox Christian attitude towards the Syrian government Basically, the pan-Arab ideology, the secularism with its friendly attitude towards religious minorities, stability and safety are the main pillars of the Baath party's rule.
The Greek Orthodox Christians share an ideological affinity w ith this secular party. Not only the Greek Orthodox Antoun Sa'adeh (1904 Sa'adeh ( -1949 was one of the architects of Syrian nationalism, but also even Michel Aftaq -the ideological founder of the Baath party -was a Greek Orthodox. Historically, the "Syrian Social Socialist Party" (SSNP) was regarded as the only party that was able to handle the problems of Syria's ethnic and religious differences after the fall of the Ottoman Empire (EI-Beshara 2011: 341-343). These two conceptual foundations were regarded as providing a common ground to unite the Sunni majority with the religious minorities under a national banner of a Syrian-Arab identity.
In contrast, the Syriac Orthodox Christians might not connect the ideology of Arabism with the support of the Baath party. Since their patriarch held a meeting with Syrian officials in 2009 and members of the " Syrian Universal Alliance" prai sed the governmental efforts for the Syriac culture (AI-Tamimi 2012: 24) , the government's support for the threatened Syriac heritage might be one of the main reasons for the loyalty of the Syriac Orthodox 's loyalty. Lastly, the military and political integration of Christians explains their supportive attitude towards the Baath party.
Bashar al-Assad's legitimacy is also based on his father's political legacy, which had been transferred to the fonner, and who seems to be further popularized, especially by the Syriac Orthodox Christians. He benefits not only from his liberal orientated Sunni wife Asma ai-Assad (* 1975), but also from , for an Arab leader rather atypical, proximity to the Syrian people:
"He [Bashar ai-Assad) (Awad 2013: II) .
Since the President often receives Christian Patriarchs covered by media attention during interreligious dialogue forums , the secular government likes to portray itself as a mediator of different religions. But despite the tolerant attitude, there is a lack of inter-religious dialogue, due to the prohibition of political and religious discussions. According to the Middle East experts, the government even deliberately initiated tensions among the religious minorities in order to consolidate its " patronage":
"The religious, social, cultural, and ethnic tensions were there and were fuelled, were used and were politicized, but before the conflict they were controlled and also manipulated by the regime (. . .) keeping it under its control, its patronage (. . .) They [Syrian offiCials) sometimes created even tensions between the religions on the micro-level, that both of them need to go to the regime to solve their problem" (Nseir 2013: 5-6) .
This strategy claims to shows that the Syrian government is not really interested in an inter-religious dialogue, but rather has an interest in a commitment of the religious minorities towards itself:
" The regime is more protected by the minorities, but it is not protecting the minorities in Syria. The regime is using the minorities to protect itself (. . .) the major or important elements that are protecting the regime are the minorities, including its own community, the Alawites" (Ibid.: 2) .
While the Syriac Orthodox Patriarch still publically supported the government in 2012, the oppressed "Assyrian Democratic Organisation" (ADO) allied itself with the opposition in a relatively early stage of the Syrian Cri sis. The subsequent raid of the ADO offices in Qamishli by the Syrian security force s revea led that opposition forces are suppressed, whatever their religious affiliation might be. further reports of attacks on Christian protesters, the murder of the priest Basil of Homs ( 1983 Homs ( -2012 , and the detention and beating of Chri stia n activist Hadal Kouky (* 1991) served as a warning to the Christian community (Syrian Chri stian s for Democracy 20 II). In thi s respect, there is certainly not only a fear of the opposition 's rule of Syria, but also anxiety around the existing rule. Only the superficial so lidarity by a state protector seems to convince the Christians of the idea, that religious minorities in key positions might protect other minorities. In conclusion, the Christians state is to prefer rather the safe option of ensuring a pluralistic identity in a national state -whi ch masks the minori ty status of their own group and ensures protection by loya lty -than the un safe option of a path to wards a democratic change with more political participation for all groupswhich in the end could bear the danger of an establishment of an Islamic state in the entire Syrian territory.
Anxiety among Chri stians can also be spread through press reports: the loyali st website Syria Trulh reported that 90% of the Chri stians in Homs had become victim s of an ethnic cleansing by militant Islami sts (Syria Truth 201 2). Shortly afterwards, the loyal channel Russia Today reported that 10,000 Christians have tled the city (Russia Today: 2012) , and the Vatican news agency Agenzia Fides published the same headline without even giving a reference of its source (Agenzia Fides 2012).
It can be argued that the Syrian government is using its allies to purposefu lly spread fear among Christians with the aim to strengthen their ties. Although the government in vested heavily to intertwine its fate with the fate of the Chri stians, its dealing with the C hristian activists discloses that its tolerance quickl y reaches its limits in case of a deviation from loyalty; as a purely pragmatic regime it could take all kind of measures to secure its political survival.
However, foreign intluence and a clear Islamization of the protests, with slogans like "Chri stians to Beirut and Alawites in the coffin" (AI-Alawi ala labul, wa al-Masihi a la Beirul) occurred during the early stages of the contlict (Staudinger 2013: 57) . f inall y, several attacks on Christians, such as the ones in Jaramana in August 2012 (AI-Tamimi 2012: 22), indicated that sectarian attacks by rebel groups posed indeed a real threat to the
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Christians. Since sectarianism is being used as a resource for mobili zation and legitimization, religious differences are fuelling the conflict's expansion as a crucial accelerant (Hasenclever & De Juan 2007: 12) . By the enrichment of religious symboli sm, the Syrian War tends to be increasingly violent which is further marginalizing the Orthodox Christians.
Conclusion
The solidarity of the Christian Patriarchs seems to reflect the attitude of the majority of the Greek and the Syriac Orthodox Chri stians. In spite of differences of opinion on details, there is a consensus across the denominations. While the Christian Patriarchs officially announced at the very beginning of the crisis that they stood behind the Syrian state, the interview results show that a significant part of the Orthodox people were silently sympathetic for the demands of the demonstrations in March 20 II . However, this initially positi ve attitude was not transformed into an active support of the uprising. On the contrary, the reluctance to join the protests dominated among the Chri stians in Syria. To the Orthodox Christians, the Syrian opposition did not provide any promising integrated policy approach. The militarization and perceived Islamisation at a very early stage of the Syrian Cri sis, led to their dissociation of the protest movement. By its internationalization and the resulting sectarian tendencies, their fear of the imposition of an Islamic State in Syria fuelled their reluctance, which finally led to their full rejection of the opposition . As a result, the Orthodox Christians try to navigate between the Syrian government and the opposition in a rational decision-making process. The majority of the Greek and the Syriac Orthodox interviewees came to the conclusion that the stable Syrian state with its Alawite President is preferable, because it guarantees the preservation of their Christian heritage though its guarantee of religious freedom. Against the backdrop of the genocide of the Syriac Orthodox congregation in 1915, as well as the ideological proximity of the Greek Orthodox Christians with the Baath party, both groups are convinced that the secular system has a protective role for the Christian minorities of Syria.
Although this choice might be surpri sing given the persecution of individual Christians opposing the government, the Orthodox Christians indeed benefit in an ecclesiastical, institutional, religious and social way from
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the Syrian State -just as the government benefits from them. Ultimately, the Christians really seem to be supportive of the Syrian government based on a quite sober analysis, not necessarily due to an absolutely sincere loyalty to the Syrian State, but rather due to their legitimate rejection of the opposition with its dominance of Islami sts. Although the Christians would have welcomed a political opening in Syria, their majority rejects it in the face of the danger of sectarian attacks and the threat of an establishment of an Islamic state, which would likely include a dhimmi status for the Christians (Leonhardt 2014: 19) . Not only the current rise and military s uccess of the so called al-Dawlah al-fslamiyah in Syria and Iraq, but also the rise of Islami sm in Lebanon, is perceived as an existential threat by the Christians. In regard to the establishment of the caliphate in parts of the region of northeastern Syria and northwestern Iraq and the latest sectarian attacks against Christians, their fear can be considered as more than understandable: Although the leader of the so-called al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah, Abu Bakr ai-Baghdadi (*1971), "offered" -or better sa id imposed on -Christians the dhimmi status according the prophetic model of Islamic law in Raqqa on February 2014, this unilateral contract was combined with the clause that the Christians have to refrain from any hostile act against the so-called al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah. Thi s most probably de liberately vague clause in reality led to a completely arbitrary handling of the Christians by the hands of the Islamists. As seen during the conquest of Mosul , only a very few Christians were "offered to be able to arrange themselves" with the dhimmi status. In contrary, the Islamists have forced most of the local Christians to either convert to Islam or to flee. In many other cases, they have not only robbed them, but punished the Christians with death by the sword (Inforadio 2015) . Comprehensibly, the Orthodox Christians of Lebanon and especially of Syria -in addition to their tendency for political si lence -show an increased desire for stability, security as well as law and order.
With the tendency of political silence on the one hand, there seems to be neverthe less a stylization of Christians as victims of the civil war on the other hand:
" They used to say that Christians are so important to the Arab society, but they will be destroyed in the Middle East. Every community uses this language to speak in alarm to keep the ranks unified ' (Rabah 2013: 6) .
Although most of the conflict's victims are Syrian Sunni Mus lims, this tendency of stylization existed also in the aftermath of the Lebanese Civil War among the Greek Orthodox Christians (Panzer 1998: 21) . Given the destructive chaos of the Syrian Civil War, a political solution might be the on ly solution; it is therefore necessary for the Christians -as they are inevitably part of the conflict -to attempt to work out options for the future, as demonstrated at the congress of the "Orthodox Youth Movement" (OJB) in 1970 during the Lebanese Civi l War (Kuderna 1983: 313) . Contrary to this ambiguity, it is might be useful for the Christians to act as a political entity, especially with regard to their minority status in the Levant:
"The Christians in Lebanon and also in Syria, they are divided ( .. .) they remain diverse in their political stance ( .. . ) This is also the case on the Syrian Conflict ( .. .) for the political scene the division would be g ood, but because we have this crisis in Syria it would be better to be united f or them, because they lose power and come more apart among their own sects" .
Therefore it would be important to make their moderate, non radical, but reconciling voice heard more effectively in the context of the increasing sectarian rhetoric. Despite the historic rivalry, the Syriac Orthodox Patriarchate can also be integrated into this intermediary role of the Christians: the kidnapped Syriac Orthodox Bishop of Aleppo G. Y. Ibrahim had already demanded a dialogue. In 20 12, he called for an end of the killing in Syria in his " Seven-Point Program" (Katholisch-Informiert 2012). Another important approach was the Rum Orthodox Patriarchate's statement highlighting the forgiving nature of Islam and declaring Christians and Muslims "two lungs of one Eastern body" (Orthodox Christian Channel 2014). As the media have a significant role in the awareness of the Syrian Civi l War, the position of Christians in an-Nahar with its Greek Orthodox founder J. Tuwaini (* 1957), as well as the newspaper ai-Anwar. who also had a Christian publ isher (Panzer 1998: 23) , could provide a base to initiate the beginning of a moderate discourse in the Syrian Conflict.
However, since the emigration of Christians from the Middle East is increasing, it can be assumed that the traditional Christianity -not only in the Levant -will continue to further decrease in future:
